This article assesses the dramatic shift in Chilean
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crimes committed during the authoritarian regime. Previously, the country had been studied as an example of constrained justice, illustrating the controversial compromises entailed in transitions to democracy. The efforts of the Chilean human rights community to secure the criminal responsibility of human rights abusers from the 1973^90 era contributed to the emerging field of transitional justice. But Pinochet's iconic Amnesty Law maintained a firm hold, and successive democratic governments prioritised truth processes over prosecutions. A small number of military officers were convicted in the 1990s for human rights abuses, and jurisprudential change in domestic courts prior to Pinochet's detention in London from 1998 to 2000 resulted in the indictment of others. 1 But in the immediate aftermath of the dictator's release after the UK Pinochet case, 2 the courts failed to realise the government's promises of local justice. More recently, a resurgence of prosecutions against former security personnel has occurred, led by private actors pursuing court processes and judges willing to convict individuals for dictatorship-era abuses. In fact, more than 20 years after the formal end of the dictatorship, court dockets are filled with past cases and hundreds of officials have been convicted for human rights abuses. 3 Renewed interest in the domestic Chilean experience has accompanied this revival. Scholars have studied Chile as a leading example of delayed accountability, 4 whereby injustices have been addressed after the democratic transition ended. 5 These prosecutions represent a sea change. Yet efforts to explain the surge threaten to overshadow weaknesses in human rights developments in Chile. This article assesses decision-making by the Chilean Supreme Court, identifying its limitations and setting it in the context of judicial reform and political change. Despite individual instances in which justice has been achieved and the symbolic significance of multiple convictions, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in key 'accountability case law' 6 çthat involving human rights abuses from the authoritarian eraçhas been inconsistent and narrow in scope. Lower courts are left without clear guidance on issues central to human rights protection including the position of international law in the domestic system and judge-made norms. Although these courts pioneered many of the interpretive developments discussed in this article, unpredictability in Supreme Court decision-making allows for contradictory rulings as well, increasing the potential for variation in a system that does not require adherence to precedent. Changeable sentencing practices further complicate what has been characterised as a trend toward justice for past human rights violations.
Section 2 of the article examines significant cases that represent milestones in Chilean accountability jurisprudence from 1990 to 2007. It argues that Supreme Court approaches to international law, dictatorship-era law, retrospectivity and non-statutory principles are unstable. In Section 3, the case law is viewed in light of judicial reform and political developments in Chile and framed within the relevant judicial politics literature. The dramatic shift in jurisprudence, from inertia at the start of the transition to activism 7 post-transition, can be understood as the consequence of indirect international and domestic political pressure on a conservative judiciary with new-found independence. The case law does, however, demonstrate an opportunity for expansion of judicial autonomy, in conjunction with an intermittently maturing judicial culture in Chile. 8 Judge-made rules have been used inconsistently to protect rights but, once established, they can be more readily invoked by courts and human rights practitioners in other areas.
The conclusion in Section 4 considers the activity of political actors in relation to accountability trials. In short, political leaders are also responsible for instability in this area. Even as successive governments denounced the Amnesty Law on the international stage, the executive and legislature did little to facilitate judicial resolution of human rights claims by, for example, revoking the law or reforming the criminal code to accommodate widespread human rights violations. Prosecutions were impeded by this inertia and, as a result, jurisprudential changeçtenuous as it isçrequired significant judicial innovation. The conclusion thus makes a contribution to recent debate in transitional justice literature on delayed justice, suggesting that ongoing political engagement on rights issues is a prerequisite for comprehensive accountability.
Milestones in Chilean Accountability Jurisprudence
This section identifies three main phases in Supreme Court accountability jurisprudence from 1990 to 2007. In the early years of the transition, the majority of the Supreme Court took a positivistic approach to the 1978 Amnesty Law 9 and provisions of the criminal code, key barriers to accountability. The year 1998 marks a changing point in the jurisprudence, in which the Supreme Court held that both domestic and international law required the investigation of human rights abuses covered by the Amnesty Law. In subsequent years, in the final phase, the Court developed varying creative doctrines to avoid the application of amnesty and statute of limitations rules, allowing convictions to be sustained. The judgments discussed here are notable for (i) a minimalistic use of international law during most of the post-authoritarian period, with domestic law adapted at times to incrementally align with international standards, 10 followed by the direct recognition of universal rights in recent years; (ii) the eventual identification of the authoritarian regime as illiberal but continued reliance by the Supreme Court on dictatorship-era law, including inconsistent treatment of the Amnesty Law; (iii) tension in regard to the retrospectivity of human rights standards; and (iv) use of judge-made law to support changes in the interpretation of constitutional and international law. Significantly, decision-making in these casesçresulting in accountability for human rights violationsçis exceptional when compared to results in cases dealing with contemporary rights issues. 
A. Phase I (1990^97): Vestiges of Authoritarianism
The 1990 Supreme Court decision in Insunza Bascun‹ a¤ n 12 set the tone for the first phase of accountability jurisprudence during the post-dictatorship era. In joined cases, representing 70 disappearances, the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the application of the Amnesty Law by a military tribunal. Rejecting the petition, the Supreme Court held that constitutional provisions allowing for amnesty prevailed over criminal codes that required investigations to be completed before a case could be closed. 13 Article 44 of the 1925 Chilean Constitution, still in place at the time the Amnesty Law was decreed, and Article 60(16) of the dictatorship's 1980 Constitution, both provided the state with legislative power to declare amnesty. 14 The Court elevated the Amnesty Law over other constitutional norms in place at the time of the decision. Article 5(2), providing first that the sovereignty of the state was limited by rights emanating from human nature and second that organs of the state have the duty to respect and promote those rights guaranteed by the Constitution and by international treaties ratified by Chile, 15 and Article 73, regarding judicial authority (which included making determinations of criminal culpability), did not disturb an amnesty law promulgated under the powers of Article 60. 16 The applicants had invoked common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 17 providing for fundamental protection of persons taking no part or no longer an active part in hostilities in non-international armed conflicts. 18 The Supreme Court held common Article 3 to be inapplicable because the Court did not consider the period following the coup to be one of an internal armed conflict. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 19 was not ratified until 1989, so rules against retrospectivity of law prevented its application to cases originating in the 1970s. 20 According to the Court, the declaration of amnesty is a use of legislative power which suspends a declaration of criminalityçessentially extinguishing the criminal character of an act. By implication, the Court considered the junta to be a legislative power. Insunza Bascun‹ a¤ n essentially forestalled civil remedies as well; 21 although the Court allowed that victims could pursue civil avenues, with no official investigation to determine culpability such an action would fail. 29 The lead opinion found that the Amnesty Law negated all effects of criminal action that had taken place and that such legislation is permissible under domestic law for the sake of 'social tranquillity'. 30 The opinion legitimised not only the laws of the junta but also arguments it used to justify the law, finding that the declaration of a state of siege 31 was a preventative method intended to avoid a state of war. 32 The dissenting opinion accepted that the Geneva Conventions, as international treaty law ratified by Chile in 1950, had primacy in constitutional terms over the Amnesty Law and that the investigation into the facts of the disappearances should have been completed. Two key arguments were made. First, the domestic penal code, which allowed for criminal responsibility to be extinguished in certain circumstances, and the Amnesty Law itself required identification of a responsible person. It was only possible to extinguish punishment, accordingly, if such a determination had been made. 33 Secondly, under Article 5 of the Chilean Constitution, international treaties had pre-eminence over domestic law, including constitutional law. 34 The dissenters did not specify whether they considered the Conventions, which obligate state parties to provide effective penal sanctions for grave breaches and bring those accused of such crimes before courts, 35 to require more than the establishment of the circumstances surrounding disappearances.
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Many of the minority arguments in Uribe Tambley were echoed in the lead opinion of Poblete Co¤ rdova, 37 a 5:1 decision reflecting a new composition of the Supreme Court. 38 This was the first to reinstate for investigation a disappearance case that had been dismissed by a military tribunal's application of amnesty. The Court's holding that domestic law required an investigation to determine individual responsibility 39 would have been sufficient to decide the case. Yet, a majority of the Court also found for the first time that international 29 The disappearances had been the subject of an additional legal proceeding, closed by the Supreme Court in 1995. 30 Uribe Tambley, supra n 28 at para 5 (lead opinion). ). The Court's approachçto investigate crimes before applying amnestyçdid not explicitly go beyond 'the Aylwin Doctrine' expressed seven years earlier by President Patricio Aylwin. (He had promoted the principle that courts should investigate cases to the point where the circumstances of the crime were known and criminal responsibility established.
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) As with other second-phase cases, the progressive judges on the Court indicated that the state's obligations to provide sanctions under the Geneva Conventions might be satisfied solely by investigating the facts prior to application of the Amnesty Law. 44 The majority did, however, consider that the offence might fall outside the fixed dates of the Amnesty Law, given that the whereabouts of the victim continued to be unknown. 45 The latter argument had been upheld previously by the Santiago Court of Appeal and was further developed in subsequent case law.
The Court demonstrated a preference for founding decisions in domestic, rather than international, law during Phase II. In a 4:2 judgment issued shortly after Poblete Co¤ rdova, the case of Contreras Maluje, 46 the Court allowed an appeal against a military court decision to dismiss a disappearance case, because new information had arisen through investigations undertaken by the National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation. The Court found an error in the application of domestic criminal law. Accordingly, it did not analyse arguments founded in constitutional and international law. 47 Similarly, in
Barrios Duque 48 the Supreme Court relied on domestic law to annul a high military court decision dismissing the case. 49 The facts had been the subject of two proceedings raised in regular courts and transferred to military jurisdiction; the Amnesty Law had been applied in the first case, and the military 40 Ibid. at paras 9^10 (majority) (citing common Article 3 and Articles 146 and 147; and Fourth Geneva Convention, supra n 17). 41 Poblete Co¤ rdova, supra n 26 at paras 9-10 (majority ). The Court found this to be in error. After an analysis of the criminal procedure code and domestic law principles, it held that the doctrine of res judicata in criminal matters requires common identity between the subjects of the proceedings. In the first case, no individual had been processed and, therefore, the res judicata argument failed.
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Throughout Phase II, the progressive opinions (that is, those, whether majority or dissenting, asserting that accountability cases should be reopened) relied to an extent on dictatorship-era law and declined to challenge its validity. Judges did not reject the Amnesty Law outright, treating it as an effective legal article. In Poblete Co¤ rdova, for example, the constitutionality of the Amnesty Law was not put into doubt even when the Court recognised arguments that evaded the law. When judges held that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was triggered, they invoked military decrees issued shortly after the coup to support the claim that an internal armed conflict existed when the crime took place. 53 At the end of Phase II, a critical stage in accountability jurisprudence and rights protection had been reached, but there was minimal substantive change in Supreme Court decision-making. Poblete Co¤ rdova was significant from a symbolic perspective (and in terms of its effect in that case). Significantly, it was decided before Pinochet's detention in London in October 1998. But it did not necessarily require more than identification of those responsible for human rights abuses. As a result, the wider impact of the jurisprudence on lower courts was not immediately clear.
C. Phase III (1999^2007): A (Narrowly Defined) Rights Revolution
In Phase III, the Court consolidated protection of rights related to abuses from the authoritarian era and significantly developed constitutional jurisprudence on international law. Fundamental domestic law in effect and/or promulgated during the dictatorship, including most significantly the 1980 Constitution and criminal law rules and principles, generally continued to be applied without assessment of its legality. But legislation deemed political in nature^the Amnesty Law and certain military decrees^was increasingly identified as invalid. In effect, the four cases discussed here 54 demonstrate a sea change in Supreme Court jurisprudence. 50 Ibid. at paras 2 and 5 (majority). 51 The doctrine of res judicata prevents an adjudicated issue from being the subject of a subsequent proceeding. 52 Barrios Duque, supra n 48 at paras 11 and 13. In Sandoval, two military officers appealed sentences issued by the Santiago Court of Appeal against them as principal and accomplice in a disappearance case. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions unanimously, supporting the Court of Appeal's determination that the disappearance constituted the crime of kidnapping under domestic law. Since it was not possible to determine when the offence came to an end, the Amnesty Law and statutes of limitations rules did not apply. 55 On appeal, the applicants challenged the Court of Appeal's reliance on international treaties which were not in force at the time of the initial detention. 56 The Supreme Court dismissed this and other arguments, finding that the lower court decision was based on domestic law that was only 'illustrated' by the terms of international treaties. 57 In a discussion of the content of international human rights, the Court emphasised individual freedom and recognised the 'just and legitimate right to know the whereabouts of those who have been detained'. 58 The crime of kidnapping corresponded with offences found in the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons 1994. 59 Thus, the Supreme Court illustrated its decision with international law that had not been ratified by Chile at the time of the judgment. 60 Notably, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants' arguments that their crime was illegal detention rather than kidnapping, 61 revealing an ideological view about the authoritarian government. Whereas illegal detention would imply the functionary was acting in congruence with a regular system of procedure, albeit going beyond those boundaries, the Court asserted that there was no provision for the authorities 'to detain people and take them to clandestine detention centres, and even less to apply torture'.
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There was no indication that the victim had committed a crime, no appearance before a tribunal and no relevant judicial or administrative order for the detention. 63 Thus, the applicants' attempt to frame their conduct in legal terms was rejected. The Court presented a stronger argument than it had previously that the military's activities were unlawful, yet it still did not reject the Amnesty Law outright. Aro¤ n took a more expansive approach to rights protection than Sandoval, not only solidifying the ongoing crime doctrine but also finding that Article 5 of the Constitution was violated. The latter holding laid a foundation for subsequent convictions even when killings or torture had taken place within the time of the Amnesty Law. In Aro¤ n, the Santiago Court of Appeal had applied the Amnesty Law after the first instance court had convicted the defendants, a reminder that fifteen years into the transition, not all courts evaded the law. 64 In its unanimous decision, the Supreme Court revoked the amnesty application. 65 First, the Court held that the crime of kidnapping is of a permanent character when there is no evidence the victim was liberated or suffered another consequence. 66 Secondly, the Court found that, under Article 5, domestic laws relating to statutes of limitations and amnesty must adhere to constitutional limitations and international obligations. 67 The crime was of an international character and rights to effective remedies under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) 68 and the ICCPR 69 prohibited amnesty for such crimes; in consequence Article 5(2) was breached.
70 By applying the Amnesty Law, the Court of Appeal had committed an error of law. 71 The Supreme Court used a conflict of law analysis (identifying tension between rights favouring victims and those protecting the accused) to hold that the ACHR was applicable to the case despite ratification in 1990. 'In a conflict of this character, [courts] should favour the norms that best protect human rights; this is the . . . spirit emanating from the Constitution.' 72 In this case, the Court recognised rights to truth and justice which overshadowed the doctrine against retroactive application of law adverse to defendants. 73 The 2006 Villa Grimaldi case, in which the Supreme Court (8:4) affirmed a Court of Appeal decision lifting Pinochet's immunity to be investigated for the alleged torture of several people in a secret detention centre, relied on a similar conception of the constitutional framework. The majority determined that the Chilean state generally and the courts in particular have an obligation to 64 The lead opinion in the Court of Appeal was written by a judge appointed during the dictatorship. 65 Aro¤ n, supra n 54 at s IV. Dictatorship-era Crimes and the Chilean Supreme Courtguarantee public security in times of war, including a duty to investigate and punish those who commit international crimes, and this duty existed during the authoritarian regime. 74 Article 5 provided the primary basis for the supremacy of international responsibilities 75 supported by other constitutional principles and values, such as freedom of all persons and the state's duties to ensure security and promote the common welfare. 76 According to the Court, the history of Article 5 clearly established that core values are superior to any norms promulgated by the state. The 'supraconstitutional construction' is valid not because these values are found in international instruments but because they refer to fundamental rights. 77 Conflict between internal and international law should be resolved in favour of that which most protects human rights. The Court concluded that use of the Amnesty Law and statutes of limitations must be rejected.
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The pool of international authorities deemed applicable toVilla Grimaldi was particularly wide and, given that each authority pre-dated the relevant incidents, allowed the Court to side-step the issue of retrospectivity. The Court again held that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Articles 146 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention required the state to guarantee security during periods of internal armed conflict and bring those accused of grave violations before domestic courts. 79 This analysis, now internationally accepted, 80 had been contested in domestic courts throughout Latin America in the 1990s. 81 The prohibition of amnesty for grave violations of international humanitarian law was implicit in the Court's analysis. According to the Court, principles such as these have become, moreover, jus cogens, 82 which 'all the courts in all the world' are obligated to apply. 83 Chile's membership of the United Nations and historic support for international humanitarian law and human rights law provided further justification for the Court's conclusions. 84 74 Villa Grimaldi, supra n 54 at paras 8^10. The Court even considered that a 1973 UN General Assembly resolution governing principles of international cooperation in the punishment of persons culpable of war crimes and crimes against humanity was relevant to the result. 85 International instruments stemming from executive agreement with outside bodies must be complied with, 86 and states should of course conform to treaties in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 87 requiring good faith observation of those instruments that have not been renounced. 88 Extensive citation of international judgments, including those by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 89 also marked a distinction from Phase II jurisprudence, as did the natural law arguments that pervaded the decision.
The final development in Phase III case law is apparent in the Toma¤ s Rojas case;
90 despite the execution of the victim during the period of the Amnesty Law, the Supreme Court overturned an appellate decision to dismiss the case. 91 The Court's approach to constitutional law was not substantially different from that apparent inVilla Grimaldi. Instead, the case is striking for its analysis of the political context and identification of legal illiberalism during the dictatorship, an analysis with resonance beyond the legal realm.
The applicants had sought to reopen the case in part so that culpability by superior military officers could be investigated; the victim had been killed within a military camp in circumstances in which many were involved but only one officer had been found responsible. 92 The Court considered that grave violations of the victim's essential rights had occurred, which could be considered crimes against humanity. 93 It held that Articles 146 to 148 of the Fourth Geneva Convention require not only investigation of such abuses, but processing of offenders and the establishment of penal sanctions, and that amnesty is inapplicable in relation to these crimes while the Conventions have domestic effect. 94 In addition to relying heavily on the Geneva Conventions, the case also avoided the principle of non-retrospectivity of criminal law by finding that jus cogens principles recognised at the time of the victim's death also formed an integrated part of Chilean law via Article 5(2). 95 In effect, the 
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Court held that both international treaty law and customary international law aligned to prohibit violation of 'rights emanating from human nature'.
Toma¤ s Rojas was therefore consistent with other Phase III cases in finding that core international principles have constitutional pre-eminence over internal law. 96 The judgment traced the foundation for Article 5(2) in recent constitutional history (international law constituted a limitation on sovereignty under the 1925 Constitution as well) 97 and held that international instruments related to essential rights have a higher constitutional rank than other treaties. 98 The Court noted that even a 1973 pronouncement by the authoritarian Chilean government recognised the duty of courts to apply international law. 99 In the event of conflict between international and domestic law, courts should assume that legislators did not intend to infringe international principles and interpret domestic law accordingly. 100 The Court made an even stronger natural law argument than it had in Villa Grimaldi, quoting with approval the proposition that the liberty of states to determine laws within their territories cannot infringe a 'certain nucleus of law in the conscience of all civilised societies'.
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The most salient aspect of the Toma¤ s Rojas judgment is its assessment of the illegality of certain dictatorship-era laws and recognition that ordinary courts had failed to protect rights. The Court found that the military junta destroyed the constitutional government of the time and established military jurisdiction, 102 accompanied by severe repression. 103 The killing at issue in the case took place in the context of systematic violations of human rights by state agents; the person killed was a victim of a general policy to exile, detain, persecute or execute citizens for ideological reasons or because they were suspected of impeding the political goals of the junta. 104 Conduct was actively concealed from the ordinary courts. 105 The peculiarity of the situation compelled the Supreme Court of the time 'to inhibit its intervention' such that the autonomy of military jurisdiction was maintained and oversight was located with the military general in charge. 106 In this context, those who benefited from the state of war designation were bound by international humanitarian law and could not evade sanctions for transgressing them. 107 Moreover, no state could initiate procedures that were not subject to law or morality. 108 Human rights principles prohibited the use of amnesty for war crimes 109 and self-exoneration of criminal responsibility by perpetrators of grave violations. 110 The Court identified it as a 'tragedy' when the state uses law in an attempt to certify the legality of immoral acts. 111 A candid account of the establishment and conduct of the authoritarian government had been routine in international tribunals during the Chilean transition. For example, the unvarying approach of both the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court was to consider not only the Amnesty Law, but also the 1980 Constitution and other laws put into effect by the dictatorship, as invalid. The 1925 Constitution provided that laws not promulgated by democratic means were null and void. The failure of the post-authoritarian Chilean state to amend domestic law in accordance with relevant standards and to investigate and prosecute human rights abuses provided the basis for breaches of international law. 112 In Toma¤ s Rojas, the criminal chamber of the Supreme Court echoed this analysis. More generally a significant shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence is demonstrated by the Phase III doctrine on the primacy of international law, rooted not only in Article 5(2) of the 1980 Constitution but also in state obligations to protect essential rights found in past constitutions and natural law.
D. Contradictory Decision-making
The broader picture of adherence to international standards in accountability case law is more ambiguous. First, the Supreme Court deviated from these jurisprudential trends in individual cases through at least January 2010. 113 In an isolated case in 2009, for example, the criminal chamber of the Court found that domestic statute of limitations rules prevented prosecution of a disappearance case. 114 Moreover, in recent years, the Court has routinely applied a partial statutes of limitations formula to reduce sentences of dictatorship-era human rights violators, resulting in minimal or conditional sentences for many defendants. 115 The decisions are based on a general provision of the Penal Code that requires judges to consider duration of time since the offence as a mitigating factor in sentencing, even where the statute of limitations has not been reached. 116 But they are at variance with findings in Phase III jurisprudence that statutes of limitations should not apply in cases of gross human rights abuses. The Court's calculations also have been inconsistent as to when statutes of limitations begin to run in disappearance cases. 117 The approach to sentencing differs by judge rather than being established through a particular political compromise. Another obstacle to redress for victims of gross human rights abuses is the use of statutes of limitations rules to close civil actions. The civil law chamber of the Court has found, inter alia, that the Geneva Conventions refer exclusively to criminal law and only provide the basis for not applying statutes of limitations in criminal cases. 118 These decisions, as well as delays in long-standing cases, temper the significance of the developments identified in the previous section. Although the overwhelming trend of the Supreme Court's criminal chamber was toward protection of rights and in consequence there was general uniformity amongst lower courts, lack of precedent allowed for divergence, underscoring 'the fragility of the Supreme Court jurisprudence'. 119 A second argument can be made that the Supreme Court's doctrine on the pre-eminence of international law, which could be a key legacy of accountability case law applicable in other rights cases, is tenuous. In particular, questions remain regarding whether or to what extent hierarchy of law differs depending on the rights involved. Phase II cases increasingly had found international treaties superior to domestic law through reliance on the second part of Article 5(2), added in 1989, which recognises international law ratified by Chile as a limitation on state sovereignty. The impact of these cases was tempered by the Supreme Court's findings that only the few treaties ratified at the time of a disappearance could be applied in each case and the narrow interpretation of the obligation to provide penal sanctions under the Geneva Conventions. Still, Phase II cases created the potential for further development of the doctrine in contemporary cases. In Sandoval, a broader base of international law was invoked to support a decision founded in domestic law. The case provides an example of domestic law being adapted to conform to international standards without identification of that law as binding, a trend observed in other contexts 120 which also raised the potential for future expansion of rights protection. Other Phase III cases moved beyond incremental adherence to international norms and directly applied a wide spectrum of international law and other sources. Their findings were not dependent on treaty ratification; instead, the Supreme Court held that fundamental human rights are superior to both international treaties and domestic law. The Court invoked the spirit of the Constitution, constitutional history, and other state obligations to support its view. But the Article 5(2) analysis was closely linked with the determination that jus cogens had been violated. It is quite likely that the Court's approach would be different in respect to derogable rights. In addition, the decisions turned on the severe and systematic conduct of the military. The doctrine is vulnerable to being distinguished in future cases where, for example, the general social environment is not considered to be repressive.
In sum, at the end of Phase III, Amnesty Law doctrine was generally uniform but the possibility of contradictory rulings remained. Despite the innovative nature of the Supreme Court's accountability jurisprudence, lower courts were left without clear guidance on the appropriate use of judicial discretion and the primacy of different forms of international law in rights cases. (Lower courts apply Supreme Court doctrine regarding hierarchy of law and the role of the judiciary, even if they are not bound to follow applications of law in individual cases.) Clarity regarding these fundamental principles could have facilitated the development of rights jurisprudence more generally. In addition, the context-specific decision-making in Phase III case law limited its applicability in other cases.
Explaining Jurisprudential Change in Accountability Case Law
Notwithstanding the weaknesses mentioned above, the jurisprudential shiftç from loyalty to the authoritarian regime to a fierce defence of international rightsçis striking for taking place in the post-dictatorship era without legislative change to the Amnesty Law. Between 1990 and 2007, the Chilean Supreme Court moved from upholding the law at the onset of an investigation, without assessing its lawfulness or the validity of claims, to tentative evasion of the law and eventual rejection of it. The most salient explanation for the change was constitutional reform of the Supreme Court in late 1997, although the resulting modification to the composition of the Court does not wholly account for the timing and degree of Phase III developments. This section first summarises judicial reform during the period, 121 which partially explains the shift from Phase I to Phase II case law. It then considers explanations for change in judicial politics literature and outlines a number of political factors that resulted in the conservative Supreme Court expanding rights protection in these cases. Finally, it is argued that the jurisprudence is an indicator of the surprisingly significant role that judicial autonomy plays in the Chilean legal system.
A. Judicial Reform
Prior to the democratic transition, Pinochet attempted to ensure a long-lasting judiciary supportive of the military regime by appointing a younger cohort of Supreme Court justices. To this end, he enacted legislation in 1989 providing financial encouragement for Supreme Court justices over the age of 75 years to retire 122 and appointed seven new justices out of a total of 17 before leaving office in 1990, 123 taken from a list of candidates proposed by the Court as required by the Constitution. 124 Attempts at judicial reform in the early years of the transition were largely unsuccessful, 125 except that legislation taking effect in 1995 divided the Court into separate chambers that allowed human rights cases to be heard in a particular penal chamber. 126 The most significant development relevant to the issues covered here was a modification of the appointment process by constitutional amendment in 1997 which, inter alia, (i) provided that the Supreme Court be composed of 21 justices; (ii) required agreement by the Senate to each appointment; (iii) mandated that at least five members of the Court should be lawyers outside of the judiciary; and (iv) facilitated the retirement of sitting justices over age 75 years. 127 Accordingly, 11 new members of the Court were appointed in 1998. 128 Five of those were non-judicial lawyers, marking a significant break from the 'closed, autonomous bureaucracy' 129 of Chile's established judiciary. Additional judicial and legal reforms arguably have had minimal bearing on accountability case law. For example, a dramatic change in the Chilean criminal justice process was set in motion in the late 1990s and rolled out through 2005 130 çincluding a shift to adversarial penal procedure, the establishment of Public Prosecutor and Public Defender's offices, and reform of the penal code. But cases filed under the old system were not transferred to the new system, and the timing of the reforms limited the effect on past cases. 131 Indeed, penal reform did not directly impact on any of the cases covered here. Similarly, constitutional amendments affecting the Constitutional Tribunal have not resulted in that institution weighing in on accountability issues. A quasi-judicial body which had existed under the Allende administration, the Constitutional Tribunal was revived by the dictatorship in the 1980 Constitution. 132 Those amendments gave the Tribunal power to review the constitutionality of proposed legislation and government decrees. 133 It was not until 2005 that the Tribunal's power was expanded to include jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of existing laws as applied in individual cases, 134 previously the purview of the Supreme Court. This and other reforms 135 are set to alter the juridical/political dynamic in coming years, 136 but the Tribunal has not considered the constitutionality of the Amnesty Law.
In institutional and normative terms, Chile has the potential to join the global trend of judicialisation, most notably as a result of the re-invigoration of the Constitutional Tribunal 137 and ratification and application of international human rights law. (Scholars have identified a shift toward judicialisation of politics, in which courts have become 'powerful institutional actors or policy-makers'as a result of the establishment of new or stronger constitutions, expanded use of judicial review, and/or incorporation of international human rights law. 138 ) Judicial reform during the period of transition did not, however, translate into a significant policy-making role by the traditional judiciary or members of the Constitutional Court. In 2005, Couso documented a low level of judicialisation in Chile, concluding that constitutional adjudication signified 'a ''rights revolution'' that never happened'. 139 The Constitutional Tribunal, considered key to the consolidation of democracy, failed to increase protection of human rights or judicial control over policymaking, and the Supreme Court's record was one of deference to the executive. 140 Recent decision-making by the Constitutional Tribunal indicates a shift is underway. According to Couso and Hilbink, its policy role increased dramatically in 2008, which they attribute in part to institutional reforms as well as changes to the composition of the Tribunal. 141 Interestingly, the authors discount the impact that compositional change to the Supreme Court has had on a process of judicialisation that may be developing in the ordinary courts, instead attributing it to modifications that have affected lower-court judges (in relation to training and salary, criminal procedure and their ability to raise constitutional issues before the Constitutional Tribunal). 142 In effect, activism has been identified in the Constitutional Tribunal and lower courts, 143 both of which are now less subject to direct and indirect Supreme Court control. A new intellectual environment that encourages judicial activism and development of constitutional law, particularly in the realm of rights protection, is also an influence on all courts. 144 This ideological shift may have affected the Supreme Court's Phase III jurisprudence discussed here, even if the institutional reform that Couso and Hilbink identify did not. Even so, it must be emphasised that the wider picture of Supreme Court conservatism places Phase III Amnesty Law jurisprudence in sharp relief, representing a counter-trend in rights protection.
B. Political Influences on Judicial Decision-making
Given the limited impact of reform projects on accountability case law, studies of judicial actors are particularly resonant in the Chilean context. Hilbink argues that the judiciary maintained passivity during the post-dictatorship era due to historic institutional norms; 145 in a study that covers case law up to 2000, she attributes shifts in Amnesty Law jurisprudence to the personnel changes in 1997 and 1998 and transnational pressure. 146 Comparing accountability case law to that related to post-authoritarian rights issues, Hilbink finds that, in the latter cases, the judiciary either neglected to apply constitutional analyses or was as likely to limit constitutionalist principles as to uphold them. 147 Accountability case law adhered to dominant jurisprudential judges at all levels, Huneeus argues that a significant judicial motivator in Pinochet-era cases was the attempt to atone for judicial complicity in human rights abuses during the dictatorship. 148 The analysis seeks to explain the surge in prosecutions by lower courts rather than Supreme Court activity, contending that increased public scrutiny of these cases provided an opportunity in which Supreme Court power over lower courts was checked. 149 Collins places emphasis on the role of human rights advocates, lawyers, and victims in initiating and strategically pursuing claims, although she acknowledges that the shift in accountability activity should be attributed to a combination of factors including gradual democratisation and judicial change.
150 Direct access of legal representatives to magistrates facilitated investigations; legal and political strategies of advocates promoted results.
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These studies address institutional custom, judicial culture and the conduct of private actors affecting judicial decision-making in Chile during the transitional and post-transitional periods. More narrowly, they help to explain the shift in accountability jurisprudence identified in Section 2 of this article and why results in these cases differed from those in non-accountability case law. In sum, modifications to the composition of the Supreme Court and its specialisation into chambers provided an opportunity for change which was taken upçalbeit inconsistentlyçin response to ongoing demands by victims and relatives and internal and external pressure.
The influence of the international Pinochet caseçdirectly on the courts and indirectly by way of the Chilean public and international actorsçmay not be quantifiable but pervades the Chilean human rights story from the late 1990s. The details regarding Pinochet's return to Chile and efforts to prosecute him have been well documented. 152 It is worth emphasising that Phase II case law demonstrates a process of change in human rights jurisprudence in Chile prior to Pinochet's arrest in London. That process gained momentum during his detention from 1998 to 2000 and accelerated a number of years after his release. The timing and degree of change in Phase III case law can be most readily understood when viewed alongside domestic and international political events which include those involving Pinochet.
In effect, in the 2000sçmore than 10 years after the start of the transitionçthe political consequences of sustaining claims against past human rights violators had receded and the risks of judicial apathy had increased for several reasons. First, accountability issues were no longer as politically charged as they had been in the 1990s. Public perception about the dictatorship had changed. Both Pinochet's detention and claims against the Pinochet 148 Huneeus, supra n 4 at 114^24. ) but conversely public interest in justice for past crimes had lessened. 154 Although the overall legacy of the dictatorship was still socially divisive in Chile, claims regarding contemporary rights abuses against the democratic governments were arguably more controversial than past cases.
Secondly, the judiciary's political position was propitious to divergence from past conservatism in accountability case law. The formal political power of the military had been reduced when Pinochet's term as Commander in Chief ended in 1998, 155 and judicial reform (from the late 1990s through 2005) encouraged judicial autonomy alongside an emerging legal culture that favoured the recognition of constitutional rights. 156 These changes did not translate into greater rights protection by the Supreme Court in a general sense, but, in combination with an unusual form of pressure from the government, it became more difficult for the Supreme Court to sustain use of the Amnesty Law in the face of ongoing claims by private parties. The commitment of the government to results in accountability case law can be questioned, 
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decision. Yet it declared the Amnesty Law to be legally void and, as the transition endured, became more forthright in its condemnation of military abuses. Similarly, successive governments opposed the Amnesty Law in various international fora. 160 Most famously, the prospect of domestic trials was invoked by the government in attempts to secure Pinochet's return from the UK. This internationally mediated pressure on the judiciary was augmented by the censure of the Chilean judiciary by global actors and institutions. 161 Reproach of the Supreme Court by the Inter-American bodies culminated in the Inter-American Court's 2006 finding 162 that the Chilean state, including the judiciary, continued to be in contravention of the ACHR. 163 The Supreme Court's Phase II doctrine fell short of the standards advocated by the government and international bodies. Moreover, the Court's adherence to a conservative conception of the role of the judiciary (as one that applies rather than interprets law) was incongruous with international norms with respect to the prosecution of gross human rights violations. The attention drawn to Chilean justice claims during Pinochet's detention, and the government's promises that the Chilean courts were able to decide the cases fairly, subjected accountability jurisprudence in particular to domestic and international scrutiny. In consequence, the Supreme Court was encouraged to take a progressive stance in these high-profile cases.
In its Phase III case law, the Supreme Court went beyond what was legally necessary to decide the claims in favour of victims and their families, invoking an array of international authorities and norms. Although not easy to conclusively determine, international pressure provides a plausible explanation for the Court's new approach. After the Amnesty Law was held contrary to international law by the Inter-American Court in Almonacid-Arellano 164 and then-President Michelle Bachelet vowed to repeal the law, the president of the Chilean Supreme Court stated publicly that Inter-American Court judgments are not binding on domestic courts (and it was not possible to re-open adjudicated cases). 165 Nonetheless, two months after the decision, the Supreme Court decided Villa Grimaldi, which went beyond the early Phase III cases in terms of rights protection. That case, as well as Toma¤ s Rojas five months later, was more closely aligned to Inter-American Court jurisprudence on amnesty laws and past human rights violations than any previous Supreme Court case even though Almonacid itself was not directly followed.
C. Judicial Autonomy
Chile's historically civil law system is undergoing reform in a number of realms, with the introduction (for example) of adversarial features to criminal procedure and the increasing recognition that courts should not merely apply but interpret legislation. 166 Chilean legal culture may be experiencing change, with a new acceptance of judicial independence, but the narrowly drawn decision-making in accountability case law indicates that the Supreme Court was not attempting to use the docket to broaden its powers more generally. Instead, international and domestic pressure in regard to past human rights violations had an impact on a court thatçdespite personnel changesç remains conservative. Notwithstanding the reactive and issue-specific analysis that was employed in Phase III case law, the Supreme Court asserted its authority to determine the position and content of human rights law in the Chilean system. The jurisprudence also demonstrated the importance of judge-made law in the predominantly civil system 167 and jurisprudence constante, whereby decisions are not binding on subsequent courts but have 'mature[d] into a prevailing line of precedents'. 168 The Court referred to its own doctrine on Article 5 of the Constitution as precedent, developed rules related to hierarchy of law, and invoked a wide variety of authorities to find the Amnesty Law invalid. The case law therefore aligns with broader legal trends if not the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on other matters.
Section 2 of this article identified gaps and contradictions in the jurisprudence, but nonetheless the case law demonstrates significant judicial autonomy to resolve human rights issues. Interestingly, the Court relied on not only its constitutional authority to decide the claims but also more general powers that transcended the 1980 Constitution. Protection of rights, it seems, is a duty of the Court rooted in the country's twentieth century constitutional history and values upon which the political system is based. In Phase III case law, the Supreme Court resolved Article 5's ambiguity in favour of the primacy of international law. But its fact-specific analysis, identifying the rights at issue as 'essential', allows the Court to decline to apply international law in future matters, maintaining a zone of discretion 169 to determine the relevance of Article 5. In conjunction with its power to determine the content of rights and conflicts of law, the Supreme Court can readily diverge from doctrine established in accountability case law. Still, the jurisprudence supports the rights-based approach that many lower courts have taken and provides an invitation to human rights advocates to pursue claims on other issues.
Conclusion
This article has explored the sea change in Chilean Supreme Court accountability jurisprudence in recent years, from routine recognition of the Amnesty Law in the first decade of democracy to its rejection in the mid-2000s. During Phase II, the Court began to evade the law but declined to conclusively alter established doctrine, which continued to lend legitimacy to dictatorship-era norms. Phase III represented a watershed in many respects: in Sandoval, the Supreme Court officially acknowledged abuses committed by the military regime; in Aro¤ n, Villa Grimaldi and Toma¤ s Rojas the Court renounced use of amnesty and statutes of limitations for international crimes and presented a fundamentally different view of the internal legal order, prioritising human rights law. The Court considered that judicial obligations to guarantee individual rights are rooted in the Constitution, international law and principles that transcend positive law. The case law could be viewed as politically assertive except that domestic and international pressure on the Court facilitated the dramatic shift. It has been contended in this article, however, that accountability jurisprudence remains unstable. The manner in which constitutional doctrine was developed maximises the Court's discretion and provides significant opportunity for the invocation of international law by advocates and other courts but also the anticipation of continued inconsistent results in rights cases. The groundwork has been laid for the Court to diverge from its traditional deferential role in the political system, yet social and political factors seem set to remain a significant influence on decision-making.
A final point can be made about the failure of successive governments to ensure justice for victims of human rights abuses. The point is not that government should have intervened in individual court proceedings, which would violate separation of powers principles, but that the lack of legislative and judicial reform on human rights matters impeded the ability of courts to resolve the issues. Accountability claims were not included in the political settlement that ended the dictatorship, an understandable outcome given fear that the peace process could be easily derailed. Retributive approaches were not encouraged in the early years of the transition in consideration of the military's enduring strength. 170 But nor has there been a focused political effort to deal with such legacy issues in the years since, in contrast to Chile's claims internationally. Constitutional and judicial reform (which had minimum impact on past cases, other than to alter the composition of the Supreme Court) was distinguished from initiatives to address abuses of the dictatorship, which concentrated on truth processes and reparations programmes. 171 These schemes did not make determinations of responsibility or provide restoration in individual cases other than to provide financial compensation to victims and their families. Arguably, the governments benefitted from the ambiguity and distance provided by struggling court processes, which allowed them to avoid controversial policymaking in the name of judicial independence.
Political leaders have avoided specific policy proposals regarding human rights abuses. The constancy of certain legal rules at the centre of developing jurisprudence is striking and underscores the extent to which change stemmed from the courts. Most notably, the dictator's Amnesty Law has not been repealed by Chile's Congress. Laws applicable in regular criminal cases (related to statutes of limitations, non-retrospectivity of law, double jeopardy and transfer and suspension of cases, for example) were not altered to addressçor even conversely prohibit application toçgross human rights violations. The judiciary has been compelled to adapt ordinary criminal procedure to now decades-old cases of systematic abuse by state agents that raise distinct legal issues. Sentencing law is another area where legislative activity would have been appropriate; inconsistent decision-making continues to be an issue. The position of international law in the constitutional system also remains ambiguous, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article 5 in Phase III case law. This is ripe for legislative resolution, through ordinary law or constitutional amendment. Finally, in the absence of binding precedent, legislation could have been introduced to ensure consistent interpretation of fundamental human rights law. Any change to precedential rules arguably should be made by legislators, and indeed the judiciary has deemed it inappropriate to act on the issue. (The Supreme Court commissioned an internal study which found that its decisions were not legally binding in subsequent cases because (i) the civil code stipulates that decisions only have effect in the immediate case and (ii) precedent would counter judicial independence.
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) Although the lack of binding precedent is not problematic in itself, 173 it was a significant barrier to consolidation of the anti-impunity surge in Chilean case law, resulting in contradictory conclusions in similarly situated cases and prolonged appeals. In sum, the slow pace of change and inconsistency in accountability jurisprudence reflects these obstacles as well as judicial ideology. Political leaders failed to provide courts with the legal tools to comprehensively address egregious crimes of the past.
The reticence of politicians to act conclusively to promote (or alternatively prevent) human rights trials impeded and prolonged court processes and partially accounts for variable and creative judicial doctrine. This argument is a reminder that the role of executives and legislatures, with respect to retributive accountability as part of 'post-transitional justice', should not be discounted.
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In Chile, during and after the transition to democracy, private actors attempted to resolve justice issues through court processes; they have been successful recentlyçdespite challenges that accompany the passage of timeçbecause the political climate is less hostile to such claims. But consistent and comprehensive accountability requires sustained political engagement as well, which was lacking in Chile and has not been taken up in the recent period. Arguably, governments and legislatures should play a key role in negotiations related to human rights violations of previous regimes; in Chile at this late date, politicians should act to address irregularities in the application of human rights law and in sentencing matters, however unpopular the topic. Legal reform related to the domestic position of international law would promote consistency between past and contemporary rights issues and improve protection of rights more generally in Chile. 172 See Valenzuela, supra n 27. 173 See Merryman, supra n 168. 174 Recent scholarship has identified the theory and practice of post-transitional justice and conceptualised the role of the state as diminishedçin respect to dealing with past human rights abusesçwhen compared to the period of transition. See, for example, Collins, supra n 4 at 34^5; and Skaar, supra n 4 at ch 2.
